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ABSTRACT
In recent years, governmental and nongovernmental organizations in many low-income
countries  have  introduced  credit  programs  targeted  to  the  poor. Many  of  these  programs
specifically target the poor on the premise that they are more likely to be credit constrained and
have restricted access to the wage labour market. Though participation is by choice, little is
known about the role of credit on welfare. The purpose of this study was then to assess the role
of credit service on welfare of the microfinance clients. It was also to enable the microfinance
institutions assess if they are achieving the intended objectives of their program. The study area
was Bomet District and the sample was drawn from Mulot and Silibwet “village banks”. A
sample of 125 “village bank” members was selected, out of which 91 had used the credit service
and  the  other  34  had  not.  Primary  data  on  the  selected  respondents  were  collected  using  a
structured  interview  schedule  and  secondary  data  were  obtained  from  the  selected  “village
banks” operating in the study area and relevant government departments in the district. The study
used analysis of variance and Heckman’s selection model which corrects for selectivity bias in
the  sample.  This  consists  of  a  probit  equation  (borrowing  participation  equation)  and  target
equation of household expenditure. The results from the study indicated that farm income, off-
farm income, distance to market and household assets influences the probability to participate in
“village bank” credit. The household income of credit participants was also higher than that of
the  non-participants.  There  was  a  positive  relationship  between  the  amount  borrowed  and
household expenditure. Age of the household head, farm income, distance to market and off-
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1.1 Overview of “Village banks”
“Village banks” are semi-formal, member-based model that are promoted by international
nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  first  by Foundation  for  International  Community
Assistance (FINCA) and then later – with modifications to the original model with respect to
complementary services or greater decision autonomy granted to members - by Freedom from
Hunger  International  (FHI), Catholic  Relief  Services  (CRS),  Save  the  Children,  and  others
(Zeller and Johannes, 2006).  The village bank is owned by the members, but ownership is not
formally  registered.  Members  can  decide  on  interest  rates  for  internally  generated  savings
deposits and on-lending their internal fund, and usually attracts high interest rates on loans and
savings deposits compared to going rates in the commercial banking sector. The banks serve a
poorer clientele compared to credit unions and have a high share of female members. Village
banks are promoted with the ultimate objective of reducing poverty. Emphasis is therefore on
depth of outreach and effect on welfare, and NGOs often provide complementary services such
as education or business training to enhance impact.
A village bank is less complex in structure and administration than a credit union, thus
enabling less educated members to manage the bank. They are intended to be the building blocks
for  a  network  of  institutions  that  offer  financial  services  where  no  traditional  Grameen
Bank/FINCA-inspired system will ever reach (Wright et al, 2000). They seek to do this through
business-oriented membership-based organizations. However, start-up costs for formation and
training are believed to be relatively high and are externally financed by the supporting NGO and
its  donors.  The  main  form  of  credit  guarantee  relies  on  social  pressure.  One  of  the  major
comparative advantages of village banks – especially for rural areas - is that they can eventually
operate as autonomous institutions and thus are highly flexible in determining rules of admission
and the level of savings and loan interest rates adapted to local socio-economic conditions. The
expectation is that the village banks accumulate and retain sufficient equity capital to become
self-reliant.
Collateral-free lending, proximity, timely delivery and flexibility in loan transactions are
some of the attractive features of informal credit. However, informal finance may not be as2
conducive to development as formal finance because: (i) it is expensive; (ii) it is short-term and
largely used for consumption; and (iii) it is not generally large enough to spur investment and
growth (Khandker  and  Faruque, 2003).  Notwithstanding  the  limitations  of  informal  finance,
many governments have attempted in the past to develop alternative financial institutions to
provide credit to farmers and other rural producers. Many such attempts have failed not only in
delivering credit to target households but also in promoting a viable credit delivery system. High
covariate risk of agricultural production, the asymmetric information, lack of enforcement of
loan contracts, government imprudent interference in credit markets, and rent-seeking as a result
of credit rationing are some of the factors alleged to be responsible for the poor performance of
the government-directed credit schemes in many countries (Khandker and Faruque, 2003). With
the dismal picture of state-owned rural finance organizations, non-governmental micro-finance
institutions have been growing to meet the credit needs of small producers in many countries.
Many of these organizations are subsidized not for absorbing high loan default costs but for
covering  high  transaction  costs  associated  with  group-based  lending  and  other  social
intermediation costs (Khandker and Faruque, 2003).
“Village banks” otherwise known as Financial Service Associations (FSAs) are a model
that K-Rep Development Agency (KDA) has used to reach further into rural areas (Johnson et al,
2005). Members buy shares and the capital is used for on-lending. When the membership reaches
at least 300 members, an FSA (“village bank”) elects a board of directors, employs a locally
recruited  manager  and  cashier,  and  commences  lending.  K-Rep  Development  Agency  is
promoting the model in Bomet District and currently there are six (6) “village banks” operating
in the district.
1.2 Background of the Study
Many scholars have argued that micro enterprise development can be an effective means
of assisting the poor in developing countries (Zeller and Sharma, 2000). Micro enterprises have
the potential to create employment especially given that, in Africa, the agricultural sector has a
limited ability to absorb new job seekers (Pretes, 2002). In the World Bank’s “World Business
Environment Survey” (WEBS) of more than 10,000 firms in 80 countries, Small and Micro
Enterprises (SMEs) worldwide on average named financial constraints as the second most severe
obstacle  to  their  growth,  while  large  firms  on  average  placed  finance  only  fourth.  Firms  in3
Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa were most likely to cite finance
as their most severe constraint, followed by those in South Asia and Latin America. World Bank
researchers  Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt,  and  Maksimovic (2003) concur  that  SMEs  are more
financially constrained than larger firms. There have been some striking experiments mostly
from outside Africa and have allegedly produced impressive results; usually measured in terms
of outreach and repayment rates, and have been driven largely by the perceived demand for
credit (Buckley, 1997).
Food insecurity had and also continued to be a major development problem across the
globe, undermining people’s health, productivity and often their very survival (Smith, 2007).
Efforts to overcome the development challenges posed by food insecurity necessarily begin with
accurate  measurement  of  key  indicators  at  the  household  level.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that
identification of household behaviors relating to food access serves as a critical building block
for the development of policies and programs for helping vulnerable populations, the effective
targeting of assistance, and evaluation of impact (ibid).
The biggest challenge facing Kenya today is high levels of poverty among its citizens.
Poverty has been persistent in Kenya despite government’s effort to combat it through national
development programs. This is reflected in the rising number of people without food, and with
inadequate  access  to  other  basic  necessities  (Mango et al.,  2009).  Kenya’s  current  Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) perceives poverty as inadequacy of incomes and deprivation of
basic needs and rights, and lack of access to productive assets, as well as social infrastructure and
markets. The minimum level of consumption at which basic needs are assumed as satisfied is
known as the poverty line (Mango et al., 2009). Most of the poor live in the rural areas and
include  subsistence  farmers  and  pastoralists  (Mango et  al.,  2009).The  majority  of  Kenyans
however  live  in  rural  areas  with  agriculture  as  their  main  occupation  (Owuor et  al.,  2001).
Poverty is still largely a rural phenomenon and prevalence of absolute poverty in rural Kenya is
49.1%, while the ratio for male-headed households at 48.8% was slightly lower than for female-
headed households at 50.0% (GOK, 2007).4
Table 1.1: Summary of Poverty Measures
WMSIII-1997 KIHBS-2005/2006
Region Poverty Measure Households (%) Households (%)
Rural Food 43.4 38.5
Absolute 46.4 42.0
Urban Food 32.4 31.2
Absolute 43.5 27.4
National Food 41.6 36.7
Absolute 45.8 38.3
Source: GOK, 2007.
In the past, only pockets of privileged cash-crop producers had access to formal financing
and women are typically excluded from formal finance regardless of their activities (Mknelly
and Kevane, 2002). Extension of financial services into remote rural areas has been difficult and
there are few examples of successful attempts to do so (Wright et al., 2000). It is in this context
that Financial Services Associations (FSAs) otherwise known as “village banks” are intended to
be building blocks for a network of institutions that offer financial services where no traditional
Grameen Bank inspired system will ever reach.
Kenya  maintains  a  mixed  economy  in  which  the  government  is  actively  involved  in
development  planning  motivated  by  the  need  to  optimize  the  use  of  the  country’s  limited
resources to meet the national policy priorities. Poverty reduction has been a major goal of the
government of Kenya since independence (GOK, 2007). The fundamental policy priorities which
have been identified since independence are poverty, ignorance and poor health. Rural financial
services help the poor, low-income households increase their incomes, and built the assets that
allow them to mitigate risk, smoothen consumption, plan for future, increase food consumption,
invest in education, and other lifecycle events (Kibaara, 2006). Lack of adequate access to credit
have had significant negative consequences for various aggregate and household-level outcomes,
including  technology  adoption,  agricultural  productivity,  food  security,  nutrition,  health,  and
overall household welfare (Diagne and Zeller, 2001). Studies and evaluation spend less effort on
measuring impact on borrowers and more attention to analyzing the performance of the financial
systems  (Meyer  and  Larson,  1996). The  second  KEPIM  (Kenya  Participatory  Impact
Monitoring) report examines the perspectives of the poor on credit and extension services in the5
six districts of Kisumu, Butere/Mumias, Bomet, Murang’a, Mwingi and Malindi. The study,
which  was  carried  out  during  October-December  2002,  revealed  that  access  to  credit  and
extension services is limited. The majorities are excluded from the formal financial sector due to
lack  of  collateral  and  bankable  proposals,  and  thus  mainly  rely  on  merry-go-rounds.  The
provision of government-based extension services is also fraught with delays due to reduced
workforce of extension workers and lack of financial resources.
1.3 Statement of the Problem
In Kenya, the proportion of rural poor is 49% (as per adult equivalent) (GOK, 2007). Lack
of access to credit has had a negative impact on education, employment opportunities and health
services,  hence  perpetuating  the  vicious  cycle  of  poverty  and  adverse  vulnerability.  Many
organizations  are  thus  now  using  microfinance strategies as  a  way  of  providing  affordable
financial services targeting the vulnerable in a bid to improve on their welfare. The “village
bank”  model  is  one  of  such  strategies. Despite  concerted  efforts  by  various  microfinance
organizations to mitigate problems facing the rural poor in Bomet District, the plight of the poor
still remain unabated. However, since the implementation of the “village bank” strategy began in
the district little is known about the effect of credit on welfare of the beneficiaries in question
and the area at large.
1.4 Objectives
The  overall  objective was  to evaluate  the role  of “village  bank” credit  service in
influencing the household welfare in Bomet District.
The specific objectives were to:
i. Establish  the difference  of  incomes  of  the  household who  are participants  and  non-
participants in “village bank” credit in Bomet District.
ii. Determine the effect of the “village bank” credit on household expenditure in Bomet
District.
1.5 Hypotheses
i. The income of the households that accessed “village bank” credit does not differ from the
income of those that have not accessed.6
ii. The “village bank” credit accessed does not lead to increase in household expenditure
(i.e. education, food consumption and housing).
1.6 Justification
The first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets to reduce the proportion of people
whose income is less than 1$ a day and who suffer by hunger by halve by the year 2015 (UN,
2006). Also in June 2003, Kenya Government launched an Economic Recovery Strategy for
Wealth Creation and Employment in order to halt and reverse further economic degeneration and
poverty (GOK, 2004). Hence, credit programs given their mission to reach out to the poor by
enabling them access financial services have attracted large sums of funds. Because government,
donor and charitable institutions/foundations subsidize micro credit programs, impact assessment
of their products form a basis for asking additional funds. The providers of funds however have
wanted  to  know whether  microfinance  programs  have impacted  positively  on  participants,
financial institutions and economies. Understanding welfare status changes within the household
and the households’ basis of making rational decisions helps the policy makers in knowing who
the poor are, and what makes them poor.
Micro credit contributes to mitigating a number of factors that contribute to vulnerability
whereas the effect on income-welfare is a function of borrowing beyond a certain loan threshold
and to a certain extent contingent on how poor the household is to start with. Smoothing of
consumption,  building  assets,  providing  emergency  assistance  during  natural  disaster  and
contributing  to  female  empowerment  are  some  of  the  ways  that  micro  credit  reduces
vulnerability. Given the cost effective nature of the program, it is imperative to assess the effect
of their services to guide on expansion of their operation. It is also imperative to know the degree
of correlation that exists between the services offered by the micro-credit programs (savings,
credit and other services), and the change in the quality of life of their members. The rationale
behind establishing the role of credit on welfare is the expectation that the findings will be used
to bring about improvements in policies, programs, and thereby  contribute to economic and
social betterment. This knowledge will strengthen intervention strategies for credit programs and
identify the main reasons for the dropout of members from the credit programs. It will help the
credit programs to learn the effectiveness of their products and services and thus forms a basis to
improve  them  in  order  to  maximize  impact  on  social  and  economic  development  on  the7
members. There is thus a justified need for an evaluation study of the effect of access to credit as
a  way  of  getting  feedback  from  the  borrowers.  In  addition,  it  will  assist  policy  makers  in
identifying the right financial policies for rural areas, thereby improving the welfare of the rural
poor. This will be an important step in policy formulations to aid in tackling the challenges of
poverty  by  better  directing  and  targeting  credit  services. With  the  aforementioned  issues
therefore, this study was not only relevant but also necessary.
1.7 Scope and Limitations
The parameters of interest are household income and expenditure as they influence and
determine the welfare of households. The assets considered include only the movable assets
which  had  a  market  value  for  example  electronics  and  furniture.  The  expenditure expenses
pertained to the recurrent expenses for consumables within the household.
The limitation of the study was lack of time series data, limited resources being time,
finances, and accessibility of the clients given their locations and road infrastructure status in the
rural areas in Bomet District.8
1.8 Definition of Terms
Household: A group of people bound together by ties, kinship, or joint financial decision; who
live together under single roof or compound, answerable to one person as the head and share the
same eating arrangement.
Poverty: It includes  lack  of  access  to  productive  assets,  lack  of  access  to  social  services,
dependency and inability to participate and lack of access to basic infrastructure.
Village Bank: This is a user-owned, user-financed and user-managed microfinance model with
members having symmetrical information on each other’s credit worthiness.
Food security: Access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life
(Bickel et al, 2000).
Credit: A contractual agreement in which a borrower receives something of value now and
agrees to repay the lender at some later date. In this study valuable item in transaction is money
either in cash or cheque.
Vulnerability: Vulnerability of a person is conceived as the prospect a person has now of being
poor in the future, i.e. the prospect of becoming poor if currently not poor, or the prospect of
continuing to be poor if currently poor.9
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.1 Access to Credit
Studies  on  impact  of  access  to  credit  on  credit  service  beneficiaries  are  extensive.
Coperstake et al., (2001) on assessing the impact of micro credit in Zambia had three objectives.
The first was to identify the individual characteristics of the loan recipients such as gender,
relative  poverty  and  age  of  business;  and  to  estimate  the  program’s  depth  of  outreach.  The
second was to identify and estimate the direct impact of loans on borrowers, their businesses and
their households. The third objective was to identify indirect effects of the programme. The study
drew upon three sources of data: a questionnaire-based sample survey of program participants,
secondary survey data drawn from the wider population of businesses and households and a set
of  qualitative  focus  group  discussions  and  key  informant  interviews.  The  randomly  selected
sample for the study was from three groups. Group 1 comprised borrowers who obtained their
first loan between one and two years before the reference month; group 2 obtained their first loan
between one year and eight months before, and group 3 had yet to receive a loan by the end of
the reference month. The last group served as a control group, since it comprised people who had
already  been  screened  by  the  program  as  eligible  for  loans  using  the  same  criteria  as  the
borrowing groups.
The findings of the study were that those who graduated from their first to a second loan
on average experienced significantly higher growth in their profits and household income, as
compared  with  otherwise  similar  business  operators.  These  borrowers  also  diversified  their
business  activities  more  rapidly.  However,  some  borrowers  became  worse  off,  particularly
among the 50 per cent or so who left the program after receiving only one loan. Qualitative
enquiry  suggests  the  trend  to be  due  to  rigid  group  enforcement  of  fixed  loan  repayment
schedules  without  regard  to  income  fluctuations  arising  from  ill  health,  theft,  job  loss,  and
fluctuating demand.
Diagne and Zeller (2001) study analyzes the determinants of household access to and
participation in informal and formal credit markets in Malawi and much of the analysis was
devoted to measuring the effect of access to formal credit on the welfare of rural households. On
considering the patterns of access to formal and informal credit, it was established that poor10
households whose assets consists mostly of land and livestock but who wish to diversify into
nonfarm income-generating activities may be constrained by a lack of capital, as both sectors of
the market do not grant them access to credit (ibid). It thus follow that the benefits of access to
credit for smallholder farmers depend on a range of agro ecological and socioeconomic factors,
some of which are time-variant and subject to shocks such as drought. The full potential of credit
access  in  increasing  the  welfare  of  the  poor  can  only  be  realized  if  coupled  with  adequate
investments in hard and soft infrastructure as well as investment in human capital (ibid).
Sharma (2000) with an objective to examine economic and social impacts of MFIs with an
aim to evaluate the relative weight to attach to credit programs vis-à-vis other poverty alleviation
programs  to  help  them  answer  the  question  of  whether  shifting  resources  away  from  other
poverty programs toward credit-based programs is a good social policy. How credit programs
affect broader social goals such as adoption of agricultural technology, income generation, and
attainment of food security determine how much public resource is to be allocated to them given
the competing ends for the same resources (ibid).
The 2006 national survey on financial access in Kenya by Steadman Group (2007) had the
objective to:
i) Measure access to and demand for financial services and
ii) Provide a benchmark measure of effective access to financial services.
On usage of credit service, the report established 30.7% of Kenyans have a formal or
informal credit/loan service while 8.1% have used a credit service in the past. The categories
however exclude those who only borrow from family friends.
2.1.2 Credit Impact Assessment Methodologies
In the methodological approaches to doing impact assessment, Brau and Woller (2004)
identified  three  broad  options  namely:  the  scientific  method  with  principally  control-group
surveys,  the  humanities  approach  with  ethnography  and  other  qualitative  methods,  and
participatory  learning  and  action  (participatory  qualitative  tools  that  include,  for  example,
participatory rural appraisal, rapid rural appraisal and farming systems research). He concludes
that an optimal impact assessment mechanism should be a mix of the different methods for a fit
between assessments objectives, program context, human resources, and timing.11
Kay (2003) on a study to address the challenging issue of whether self-help micro credit
programmes are tools for empowering poor women underscored that the measurement of impact
of  such  programs  should  be  broader.  The  yardstick  for  measuring  the  performance  of  these
schemes should not be based on economic variables, such as loan repayment rates alone (ibid).
The  author  examined  that  while  financial  viability  is  important  for  sustainability,  indicators
should also include the contribution to meeting basic needs for household subsistence, reducing
vulnerability to risks and enhancing social capital and empowering women.
2.1.3 Outreach of Microfinance Programmes
The ability of microfinance to create significant impact on poverty is constrained by the
failure of many organizations to achieve the depth of outreach hoped for (Mushtaque et al.,
2004).  Therefore,  increasing  the  capacity  of  MFIs  to  work  effectively  with  very  poor  and
excluded people and achieve a positive impact on them forms an important focus.
Johnson et al., (2005) presented a spectrum of centralized and decentralized models with
the objective to map the frontiers of microfinance in Kenya based on poverty incidence and
population  density.  The  paper  argues  that  decentralized  model  which  involve  greater  user-
ownership and management have the potential to provide services to poorer people and in rural
areas due to inherently lower cost structures and key characteristics of their services, despite
many challenges to their long-term effectiveness and sustainability.
Johnson (2004) indicated that one of the less-discussed objectives of donor support to the
entry of MFIs into financial markets has also been to demonstrate to other players in the market
how financial services can be provided profitably to poor clients. In her study examining on the
claim that MFIs enhance competition in the financial market, the evidence suggests that MFIs
have in fact been small players in the overall financial market; while they have demonstrated the
existence of a small business market for loans, they have not significantly developed products to
appeal to a wider clientele.
Mknelly and Kevane (2002) used the experience of a micro credit program in Burkina
Faso to draw to aspects of performance, design, and implementation of micro credit projects with
the  hope  to  extract  useful  lessons  for  other  credit  institutions  that  use  group-lending
methodologies. In general, the study established that services offered must be flexible to better
meet  client  needs  and  maintain  retention  while  keeping  costs  low.  Standardized  loans,  self-12
managed groups and highly decentralized delivery systems are very attractive in the start-up
phase  (ibid).  However  as  the  financial  institution  matures  and  borrowers  become  more
sophisticated, new mechanisms must be developed that respond to the differentiated borrowing
and savings products that clients need to improve their livelihood security, smooth consumption
and cope with shocks and life-cycle changes (ibid).
2.1.4 Role of Credit on Poverty Alleviation
Khandker in Morduch and Haley (2002) underscores that if benefits of a credit program
are limited to consumption, it appears to be more effective than other targeted poverty alleviation
programs. It also seemed to be more cost-effective than non-targeted programs, such as rural-
based formal finance or infrastructure development projects. For all programs considered in the
study, credit program seems to incur the lowest cost for the same dollar worth of household
consumption.
Kevin in Morduch and Haley (2002) alludes that income-poverty reduction was a function
of two factors: the rate of growth and the distribution of income. Education generates important
benefits in both areas, as it is positively associated with the rising productivity and innovation
upon which economic growth depends.
Chen et al., (2006) indicated that few studies focus on the relationship between financial
development  and  income  distribution.  Existing  studies  explored  the  association  between
economic  growth,  financial  development  and  income  distribution,  with  income  distribution
treated as exogenous. Banerjee and Newman in Chen et al., (2006) maintain that the initial
income gap would not be reduced unless financial markets (especially the credit market) were
well developed. Clark, Xu and Zou in Chen et al., (2006) using cross-country data, explored how
financial development influenced income distribution. They all found that financial development
robustly reduced the level of income inequality.
Pretes (2002) argued that “microequity” finance, in the form of small business startup
grants,  might  be  preferable  to micro  credit  programs  that  provide  small  loans.  The  study
established that in most business ventures, a variety of financial services were needed to cover
different stages and needs of the business at any given time. It indicated that in developing
countries, loans (especially for very poor residents) might not be the most appropriate source of
financing for new or innovative micro enterprises. Loans may instead be suitable in cases where13
a micro enterprise was already profitable and can afford the risk of a loan for business expansion.
It  thus  concluded  that  equity  grants  fill  a  real  need  in  assisting micro  enterprise  startups,
especially in new and innovative programs where risk was greater; and grant based programs
also had the best chance of reaching the very poor.
Zeller and Sharma (2000) research on the demand for financial services pointed out that
product innovation that responds to the food security motives of rural households led to higher
outreach and higher impact on the poor. However, policy also needed to recognize that while the
poor were creditworthy and able to save and insure, financial institution may still fail to cover
their costs, even with improved products. Financially sustainable institutions could not serve
many of the poor, particularly in remote areas having high transaction costs, (ibid).  The primary
role of policy should therefore be to foster institutional innovation such as Financial Services
Associations (FSAs) also known as “Village banks”.
Diagne (2000) study on the practice and performance of joint liability group lending in
Malawi  provides  evidence  on  the  extent  to  which  peer  selection,  peer  monitoring,  and  peer
pressure are taking place in the credit groups. Based on the study findings, it is concluded that
the prominence given to the joint liability in explaining the high repayment rates does not hold
up universally. In addition, MFIs targeted to poor people can operate successfully and achieve
high loan recovery rates if they develop lending technologies that do not rely on collateral, but
instead  cultivate  borrower’s  expectations  for  higher  and  continuous  access  to  credit,  and
establish an effective screening and monitoring system using their field staff. Empirical findings
also suggest that joint liability can have a negative impact on loan repayment (ibid).
2.1.5 Food Security
United States department of agriculture (USDA) with a goal of reducing the prevalence of
very  low  food  security  among  low-income  households  suggested  changes  in  nutritional
assistance policies and programs (Nord, 2007). The study suggested that information about the
composition, location, employment, education, and other characteristics of households with very
low food security may provide important insights to guide these policy changes and improve the
food  security  of  economically  vulnerable  households.  Hence  achieving  the  food  security
objective may depend not only on improving the effectiveness and accessibility of nutrition
assistance programs, but also on improving other key household circumstances (ibid).14
Jayne  et  al  (1994)  indicated  that  protecting  vulnerable  groups’  access  to  food  often
requires access to credit for both food and farm inputs. Poorly-functioning financial markets
however  generate  side  effects  that  reduce  future  productivity  growth,  i.e.  liquidation of
productive assets during droughts, forced labour migration, and malnutrition (ibid).GOK (2007)
with an objective to determine the impact of the long rains on the food security indicated that
there has been an additional improvement in the food security status in the country after the 2007
long rains. The findings indicated that households continue to recover from the adverse effects of
a  succession  of  poor  seasons  before  the  2006  long  rains. GOK (2004)  established  that  the
communities  in  arid  and  semi-arid  lands  of  the  country  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  food
insecurity because of the recurring natural disasters of drought, livestock disease, animal and
crop  pests,  and  limited  access  to  appropriate  technologies,  information, credit,  and  financial
services.  Demands  from  farmers  fall  under  different  categories  such  as  information,  new
technology,  credit,  value  addition  and  marketing.  Some  of  the  demands  can  be  provided
immediately,  while  others  require  research  or  borrowing  of  technology  from  elsewhere  or
seeking for financial resources in case of demands on credit (ibid).
However despite the enormous literature on credit and its correlates, it was important to
establish the effect of user-owned credit program like “village bank” model on the household
welfare.
2. 2 Conceptual Framework
This study used utility theory within the agricultural household model (Singh, Square and
Straus, 1986) to analyze effects of “village bank” credit on household’s welfare. The framework
explains the effect of credit and household specific characteristics on welfare as measured by
household  assets,  income,  food  security  status  and  expenditure; given  the  interplay  of
institutional factors.  The assumption is that the household’s ranking of goods to consume can be
represented by a utility function of the form
Utility=U(x1, x2,..., xn; other things)………………………………….......………......…Equation 1
Where the x’s refer to the quantities of the goods that might be chosen, “other things” notation is
used as a reminder that many aspects of individual welfare are being held constant (Nicholson,
2005). Households’  attempt  to  maximize  their  gains  and  they  do  this  by  increasing  their
purchases of a good until what they gain from an extra unit is just balanced by what they have to15
give up to obtain it. In this way, they maximize "utility"—the satisfaction associated with the
consumption of goods and services.
The utility the household derives from the various consumption combinations depends on
the preferences of its members, which in turn is influenced by a vector of household size such as
members’ composition and structures.
The  maximization  of  household  utility  is  however  subject  to  cash,  time  and  output
constraints (see Equations 2).
) ; ,..., , ( 2 1 welfare U n Max    ……....................……………………....Equation 2
Subject to:
a) Cash constraint
b)  Time Constraint:
c) Output Constraint
The cash constraint implies that the household needs cash to purchase goods that it cannot
produce.  The  cash  is  generated  from  its  marketable  surplus.  From  its  surplus  income,  the
household  must  pay out  hired  labour  and  material  inputs  as  well  as  paying  for  purchased
marketed  consumed  goods.  If  the  household’s  surplus  income  is  not  adequate  to  finance
production  costs,  she  must  depend  on  external  financial  services  such  as  transfers  and
borrowings. Hence, household’s income in a single decision-making period is composed of its
net farm earnings from production, and income that is “exogenous” to the farm production such
as transfers and borrowing. In effect, credit enters the household’s utility maximization objective
function through the cash constraint.16
Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Framework Source: Adapted from Sebstad et al (1996)
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The  household’s  utility  maximization  is  also  subject  to  time  constraint  because  total
income available must be allocated among leisure, farm production, and off-farm employment.
In effect, credit enters a time-constrained household indirectly to buy out his leisure through
hiring labour.
Production is also subject to a technical constraint and the household production capacity
as defined by the amount of available variable and fixed inputs.
But taking a loan is a risk in itself, yet clients are willing to bear this risk. Credit default
leads to loss of access to valued financial markets as well as loss of self-esteem, confidence, and
social assets. However by the borrowers increasing their contribution to household income, they
reduce  their  households’  vulnerability  and  strengthen  their  options  in  dealing  with  shocks.
Maintaining access to credit is integral to many clients’ risk management strategy. By making
credit available, credit organizations provide clients and their household’s ways to protect them
against risk and to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves. Not surprisingly,
clients go to great lengths to repay, even when confronted with a crisis or shock. Repayment can
lead eventually to new loans and to starting on the road to recovery to restock a micro enterprise,
rebuild a house, or pay school fees.
Credit (measured as a dummy or amounts) however leads to a selectivity problem. To
correct for the selection bias, a Heckman selection econometric model is used. This model also
helps in estimating the effect of “village bank” credit on household’s economic performance.
The general model for effect of borrowing or participation on household outcome (Heckman,
1979; Greene, 2003) (with consideration of other factors of household expenditure, assets and
food security status) follows next.
i i i i i i c x y       ……………………………………............................Equation 3
Where, yi is the household outcome (household expenditure, income, assets and food security
status), xi is a vector of exogenous factors and ci is amount of credit accessed. The estimator α,
measures the effect of the credit, but because credit is a measure of borrowing, it implies that
borrowing is endogenous to yi and exogenous to some variables in xi. If the variable ci were only
endogenous  to yi  and  not  exogenous  to  some  other xi  factors,  then  equation  (3)  would  be
estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), with ci being instrumented with an appropriate
instrumental variable or estimated via treatment model. However, for the case of this study,
borrowing was also exogenous to other factors, such as household assets, income etc. Therefore,18
equation (3) had to be estimated as a heckman selection model and because of selection problem;
a participating function had to precede in the first stage to correct for sample selection problem















Where, yi are the outcomes for borrowers, x1iare the factors that influence outcome functions for
borrowers. D is the dummy variable for participation in borrowing (D=1, if borrowed/ participant
and D=0, otherwise), x1i is a vector of covariates that influence the probability of participating in
borrowing.  The  outcome yi variables  are  observed  condition  on  the participation  in  credit
criterion determined by the ‘D’ function, which is estimated via a probit model to yield β2i
estimates. The estimated β2i were then used to generate Mills ratios which were incorporated in
the second stage equation by being regressed on yi. 1, 2 are thus the corresponding vectors of
parameters and 1i 2i are random disturbance terms.
The estimation  of  the  parameters  is  accomplished  by maximization  of  the  likelihood
function using Heckman’s maximum likelihood estimation approach with details presented under
model specification in chapter three.19
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents a brief description of the study site and method of data collection
and analysis. The section covers the study area, sample selection, data collection, data analysis
and specification of empirical models.
3.1 The Study Area
The study was conducted in Bomet District of Rift Valley Province in Kenya (Figure 3.1
and 3.2). The district lies between 0 degrees 29’ and 1 degree 03’ south, and 35 degrees 05’ and
0 degrees 35’ east. It covers an area of 1,416.2 square kilometers. Narok district borders Bomet
to  the  east  and  southeast,  Bureti  to  the  north,  Nyamira  to  the  west  and  TransMara  to  the
southwest. The district is administratively divided into six divisions, namely Bomet Central,
Longisa, Sigor, Siongiroi, Mutarakwa, and Ndanai. This study covered more specifically, Bomet
central, Longisa and Sigor divisions, which are the main operational areas for the “village bank”
program. In all, the study covered two “village banks”, namely Mulot and Silibwet whose clients
spread across the district. The climatic condition of the area ranges from semi arid to highland,
with a diversified economy of which maize and tea are the main crops and dairy farming being
the predominant livestock activity. There are six “village banks” (Mulot, Makimeny, Bingwa,
Siongiroi, Ndanai and Silibwet).
By 2002 the population of Bomet district was estimated at 415,091 persons as per Bomet
District Development Plan of 2002. The district has a male to female ratio that is estimated at
94.5:100. The district’s population growth rate was also estimated at 2.7%. The overall number
of households in the district is estimated at 76,493. By 2002, 21.3% of the population was aged
between 15-25 years. The population of primary school going age was estimated at 23.9% while
the  population  of  secondary  school  going  age  was  estimated  at  9.8%  as  per  the  district
development plan of 2002.20
B OME T CE NT RA L
L ON GI S A N DA NA I
S I GOR
S I GORB OME T
S I ONG I R OI
















































ProjectedC oord inateSystem :Arc_196 0_UTM _Zo ne_37S
Projection:Transve rse_M ercator
False_ Ea sting:5000 00.0000000 0
False_ North ing:10 000000.00 000000
C entra l_M eridian :39.000000 00
Scale_Fa ctor:0.999600 00
L atitud e_O f_ Origin:0.000 00000
L inea rUnit:M eter
G eog raphicCoord inateSystem :G CS_Arc_19 60
D atum :D_ Arc_1960



















































































































Figure 3. 2: Map of Bomet District22
3.2 Sample Selection
Two of the “village banks” purposefully chosen are Mulot and Silibwet both on the reason
of the contrasting climatic condition of their catchments area and the period since establishment
of the “village bank”. Mulot’s catchment area is mainly semi-arid whereas Silibwet operational
area  is  of  highland  more  potential  weather  conditions.  The  members  identified  as  per  the
division, location, sub-location and village in which they are located is composed of those with
credit and those without. Membership in the selected “village banks” were then stratified into
those who have used credit service and those who have not. However, only borrowers that were
at least one year old in the credit program were considered by selecting those who had taken
credit by end of 2006 and those that had not used the credit facility being the control group. A
random sample was selected from the membership list as a sampling frame of 8,490 members of
which 5,085 were from Silibwet and 3,405 from Mulot. Those with loans were 2,094 and 2092
for  Silibwet  and  Mulot  respectively.  Sample  size  made of 150  members  was  selected
proportionately to the strata size but due to non-response 125 members were used in the analysis.
o Confidence level (K)  (i.e., Z-value)
95% (2-tail) = 1.96
o Expected proportion in population (R)
(50% most conservative)
o Acceptable margin of error in percent (D)
                  Hence
Hence the computed sample size is 96 but 150 respondents were interviewed to take care of non-
response and incomplete responses.
3.3 Data Collection
Primary data was collected using a structured interview schedule while secondary data
was  collected from  the  “village  bank”  and  relevant  government  departments. Parameters  of23
interest included social and economic factors, demographic patterns, investment enterprises and
decisions, per capita expenditure and respondents’ consumption patterns.
3.4 Data Analysis
Descriptive and quantitative methods of analysis were used. The sampled households are
categorized based on age;  education  level,  incomes,  and  gender  of  its  membership were
processed. Subsequently data were analyzed using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS)
15, and Stata 9.
3.5 Specification of Empirical Models
3.5.1 Analysis of Variance
To determine the difference in income between borrowers and non-borrowers, a univariate
analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  for  independence  of  means  was  used  to  compare the two
categories  of  households. ANOVA  is  a  statistical  technique  used  to  analyze  the  variance  to
which  the  response was  subject to its  various  components  corresponding  to  the  sources  of
variation which can be identified. Therefore, to test the equality of the sample means of the two
categories of households, an F test at 90% confidence level was used.
3.5.2 Specification of Heckman Selection Model
To achieve  the  second  objective  of  estimating the effect  of  credit on  household
expenditure  this  study  employed two-step  selection model,  which  is  accomplished  using
Heckman’s selection correction method.
As pointed in the previous chapter, Heckman selection regression model involves two
stages. The first stage involves a probit model to predict the probability of borrowing status.
From probit estimation, appropriate inverse mills ratio (IMR) is generated which is included as a
parameter estimator in the second stage of the structural equations. This procedure solves the
sample selection problem. The effect of borrowing on household assets, expenditure and food
security status is the then determined by the significance of the betas. In a simplified form, the
structural equations and participating equation would be:
i i i i i i x c y       1 ------ borrowers structural function .................................….....Equation 5.
i i ix D     2 ---the participating function ………………........……………...…...…Equation 6.24
By breaking the expressions above, the estimation for participation function in its first stage
becomes:
i i i x D pr     2 ) ( …………………………..............Equation 7.
The left-hand side variable denotes probability of borrowing from “village bank”. The x2i
is  a  vector  of  factors  that  influence  borrowing  or  not  borrowing.  The  following  factors  are
considered; age, education, if the household own land (indicator of traceability of the borrower),
farm income, off-farm income, transfer income, assets, distance to market (indicator of location
of the borrower), household head farming years, gender if female head, household size, and
household owned land size. In stage two, structural target equations for participants are specified
as below:
i i i i
n
i
i i i i IMR x c y          1 ln ln …….................….......................Equation 8.
Where, y is household expenditure per capita. Total household expenditure is an
aggregate of cost of staple food items, non-staple fresh food items, non-fresh food items, non-
food items and contributions by the households The independent variables considered are credit
from  “village  bank”,  credit  from  the  other  sources, farm  income, off-farm income, transfer
income, distance to market (all transformed by taking natural logarithms), household head age,
and education, household size and IMR (Inverse mills ratio).
The parameters then to be estimated are β, α, and λ whereas µi, and i are the respective
error terms. Heckman selection model was used to correct for selection bias of beneficiaries of
credit service by the “village bank” model.25
3.5.3 Variable Measurement
The variable of interest are described and measured as below (Table 3.1)
Table 3.1 Variable Measurement
Variable Description Measure
hhdage Household head age Years
hhdgender Household head gender 1=male, 2=female
hhdeducyrs Household head education Years
hhdsize Household size Number
housexpcap Household per capita expenditure Kenya shillings
hhdfarmown Household head land ownership 1=yes, 0= no
offarmypcap Off-farm per capita income Number
transan Transfer income Kenya shillings
farmycap Farm per capita income Kenya shillings
asetpcap Per capita assets value Kenya shillings
ownlndsz Household owned land size Acre
vbcrdt Amount of village bank credit Kenya shillings
othcrdt Amount of credit from other sources Kenya shillings
Probability to borrow Participation in village bank credit 1=yes, 0= no
hsexpcap Household expenditure per capita Kenya shillings
distmkt Distance of the tarmac road to the market Kilometers26
CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Sampled Farmers
The  socio-economic  characteristics  presented  under  this  section  include:  gender,  age,
major  activity  of  the  household  head, and  education years of  the  household  head.  Other
characteristics include: household size, source and amount of income, landholding sizes, food
security status, value of assets, amount borrowed, credit sources and household expenditure.
4.1.1 Gender of the Household Heads
Fifteen percent of all those who drew membership from village bank had their households
headed by females while 85% were males. In the borrowers’ category 84% were male headed
households and 16% were female headed households.
The majority (85%) of the sampled households were male headed, while female headed
households constituted only 15%, of which 75% of them had benefited from credit facility from
the lending institutions (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Household Head Gender Distribution According to Participation in Credit Programme





4.1.2 Age Distribution for the Household Heads
A greater proportion of the household heads in the sample fell between the ages of 19 and
49 years, where males represent 69% whereas 65% are females whereas those of age above 50
years are composed of 30% males and 35% females (Table 4.2).27
Table 4.2: Household Head Gender and Age Category Distribution
Age Category(Years) Male (%) Female (%)
12-18 1 0




4.1.3 Household Membership Distribution
Most of the household members in the sample were residing in the household (Table 4.3)
and of the members of age less than 12 years, 87% were resident members whereas 13% are non
resident members.
Table 4. 3: Paired Mean Differences of Household Membership according to Residence
Resident to non-resident Mean Std. Dev Std. Error Mean t Sig. (2-tailed)
<12 1.777 2.242 0.197 9.036 0
12 to 18 0.977 1.963 0.172 5.675 0
19 to 49 1.585 3.049 0.267 5.925 0
>50 0.308 1.041 0.091 3.371 0.001
Source: Survey data.
That of 50 years and above age category was composed of 70% and 30% resident and
non-resident  membership  respectively (Table 4.4).  Hence  movement  of  resources  out  of  the
household in terms of remittances and into the household in terms of transfer income become
key variables of importance.
Table 4.4: Household Members Gender Distribution among given Age Categories
Age category(Years) Resident (%) Non – Resident (%)
<12 7.30 12.70
12 to 18 74.41 25.59
19 to 49 72.59 27.41
>=50 69.61 30.39
Source: Survey data.28
The distribution of household membership according to gender however indicates that females
were  more than male members in the ‘less than 12’ and ‘19 to 49’ years of age categories with
males being more than females for the ’12 to 18’ years of age category (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: Paired Mean Differences of Household Membership according to their Gender
 Mean number of males to females Mean Std. Dev Std. Error Mean t Sig. (2-tailed)
<12 -0.362 1.661 0.146 -2.481 0.014
12 to 18 0.193 1.206 0.106 1.825 0.07
19 to 49 -0.469 1.744 0.153 -3.068 0.003
>50 0.062 0.583 0.051 1.208 0.229
Source: Survey data.
The males in the ’12 to 18’ years of age category are 25% whereas females were 23%. In the
‘less than 12’ and ’19 to 49’ years of age categories females were 26% and 39% respectively
compared to male counterparts who were 24% and 36% respectively (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6: Number of Household Members by Age Category and Gender
Age category(Years) Males (%) Females (%)
<12 23.55 26.14
12 to 18 25.16 22.55
19 to 49 36.13 38.56
>50 15.16 12.75
Source: Survey data.
4.1.4 Sources of Credit Accessed.
Among the 134 members interviewed, 62% had used the credit facility from the “village
bank”  whereas 5%, 22%,  and 11%  had  used  credit  facility  from  semiformal,  informal,  and
formal sources respectively (Table 4.7). Given also the fact that Mulot “village bank” started its
operation earlier i.e. 1999 as compared to Silibwet “village bank” in 2003, the borrowing is 66%
and 57% for Mulot and Silibwet respectively.
The comparable sources of credit for both “village banks” are of similar trend except for
semiformal sources whereby Mulot members get 1% of its credit from the source as compared to
Silibwet with 10% of its members getting their loans from it.29
Table 4.7: Credit Accessed Sources Distribution as per “Village Bank”
Credit source Mulot Silibwet Total
Village bank (%) 66 57 62
Informal (%) 21 22 22
Semiformal (%) 1 10 5
Formal (%) 12 10 11
Source: Survey data.
In the  non-borrowers  category,  29%  and  28%  participated  in  extension  services  and
farmer  trainings  respectively  whereas  the  participation  of  borrowers  is  71%  and  72%
respectively (Table 4.8).
Table 4.8: Participation in Extension Services and Farmer Trainings
Village bank Members Non-Borrowers (%) Borrowers (%)
Members who had extension contacts 28.89 71.11
Members who attended farmer training 28.00 72.00
Source: Survey data.
4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 Effect of Credit on Household Income
Income  has  been  a  common  denominator  on  which welfare  status  is  gauged.  Hence
analysis of variance was used to analyse the difference of household income for those who have
taken credit from the “village bank” and those who have not.
The premise behind the analysis was that credit is usually used as a policy tool in the
acquisition and use of purchased productive inputs with expected increase in production and
subsequently increased income. Borrowers were therefore, expected to acquire and use more of
such inputs and consequently realize higher returns compared to non-borrowers. Factors such as
fertilizers, crop and animal protection chemicals, purchased livestock feeds and hired labour can
easily  be  accessible  when  farmers  are  less  cash  constrained. “Village  bank” credit non-
participants  were  households  who although members  of  the “village  bank”  group, had  not
participated in borrowing.
The income of those that indicated participation in credit was found to be higher than their
counterpart who did not participate in the credit programme (Table 4.9).30
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics of Household Income (Natural log of total income)





Hence  the “village  bank” credit participants  in Bomet had  significantly  higher mean
income of 12.30 compared to non-participants mean of 11.87, with p-value of 7% (Table 4.10).
Hence  it  can  be  inferred  that  participation  in  credit increases  the  income  through  improved
frequency  of  attendance  to  farming  training  and increased  extension  contacts,  among  other
factors.
Table  4.10:  Analysis  of Variance  Household  Income as  per Participation in  the Credit of
“Village Bank”
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Between groups 4.349 1 4.349 3.250 0.074
Within groups 171.426 128 1.339
Total 175.775 129 1.363
Source: Survey data
The findings conforms to that of Remenyi et al., (2000) that indicated that household
incomes of families with access to credit is significantly higher than for comparable households
without access to credit.
4.2.2 Effect of Credit on Household Expenditure
Household expenditure, unlike income or assets depicts real purchasing power as other
sources of income for expenditure are rarely captured in the income variable. Expenditure here
was composed of food and non-food household expenses. These were expenses on consumable
items and remittances which were recurrent except for the purchase of assets. The model wald
test chi-square  of 3,405.13 was significant with a  p-value  of 1% which indicates  that  the
variables included in the model best specify the functional relationship in the model (Table 4.11).
The likelihood ratio test that is significant also with p-value of 1% indicates the correlation of the31
error terms in selection and target equation and hence justifies the use of Heckman selection
model.
Table 4.11: Summary Statistics of Variables used in the Heckman Selection Model
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
lnhsexpcap 130 9.754 1.167
lnvbcrdt 130 6.801 4.824
lnothcrdt 130 3.244 4.640
hhdage 130 42.515 11.939
hhdsize 130 8.569 5.019
hhdeducyrs 130 9.831 3.979
lnoffarmypcap 130 7.775 4.143
lnfarmypcap 130 8.716 2.226
lndistmkt 130 2.403 1.267
lntransan 130 1.735 3.742
hhdgender 130 1.154 0.362
lnasetpcap 130 9.349 1.051
hhdfarmown 125 1.008 0.089
lnownlndsz 130 1.035 0.860
Source: Survey data
The partial correlations of the exogenous variables in the selection and target equation
were insignificant and hence there is no collinearity among the said variables (Table 4.12). If
collinearity was high, estimation of regression coefficients though possible would have had large
standard errors and thus the population values of the coefficients would not have been estimated
precisely (Gujarati, 2004).32
Table 4.12: Partial Correlation of Independent Variables used in the Selection and Target Equations
lnvbcrdt lnothcrdt hhdgender hhdage hhdeducyrs hhdsize lndistmkt lnoffarmypcap lnfarmypcap lnasetpcap hhdfarmown lnownlndsz lntransan
lnvbcrdt 1
lnothcrdt -0.0866 1
hhdgender -0.0084 -0.12 1
hhdage 0.1495 -0.0782 0.1163 1
hhdeducyrs 0.1718 -0.0406 -0.1709 -0.1979 1
hhdsize 0.0933 0.2161 -0.1363 0.213 -0.0443 1
lndistmkt 0.2322 0.1353 0.1492 0.1127 0.06 0.0012 1
lnoffarmypcap 0.2909 0.1081 0.0098 -0.057 0.3246 0.0325 0.1041 1
lnfarmypcap 0.1161 -0.0389 0.2335 -0.0021 0.0336 -0.1649 -0.0112 -0.0933 1
lnasetpcap 0.0008 0.1701 0.1937 0.0287 0.1479 -0.0884 0.2429 0.2632 0.129 1
hhdfarmown 0.0619 0.0957 0.2189 -0.0233 -0.107 -0.085 0.158 0.0875 0.0061 0.0368 1
lnownlndsz 0.0728 0.065 0.085 0.4225 -0.021 0.3341 0.1899 -0.0478 0.1109 0.3225 -0.1159 1
lntransan 0.0273 0.1528 0.1244 0.1564 -0.2089 0.0525 0.2051 0.1402 0.0537 0.241 0.1801 0.2944 1
Source: Survey data33
The significant variables in the selection equation are distance to market, farm income,
off-farm  income  and  assets  per  capita  (Table  4.13). Their  influence  on  probability of
participating in the credit programme is given by their marginal effects.
Table 4.13: Step 1 Selection Probability of Participation Equation
Variable Coeff Std.Err z p>z
hhdgender -0.014 0.352 -0.040 0.967
hhdage 0.016 0.012 1.380 0.167
hhdeducyrs 0.028 0.036 0.800 0.426
hhdsize 0.025 0.030 0.840 0.399
lndistmkt 0.287 0.122 2.350 0.019
lnoffarmypcap 0.115 0.034 3.380 0.001
lnfarmypcap 0.182 0.069 2.610 0.009
lnasetpcap -0.412 0.118 -3.490 0.000
hhdfarmown -0.115 0.949 -0.120 0.904
lnownlndsz 0.122 0.173 0.700 0.483
lntransan -0.021 0.037 -0.580 0.565
Source: Survey data
The elasticity of probability to participate in credit with respect to change in off-farm
income, distance to market, farm income and assets per capita are 0.315, 0.242, 0.579, and -
1.390 respectively (Table 4.14). It follows therefore then that a 10% increase in off-farm income
leads to a 3.15% points increase in the probability of borrowing from the “village bank”. It’s
worth nothing here that most of the off-farm enterprises that the households are engaged in
generate  more  regular  income  and  are  not  as  prone  to  vagaries  of  weather  as  the  farming
enterprises. Hence it would be a good basis for assessing the ability of the potential borrower to
service loans.
Likewise the farm income was positively and significantly related to the probability of
participating  in  credit. A  10%  increase  in  farm  income  led  to  5.8%  points  increase  in  the
probability  to  access  credit. It’s  always  the  case  in  developing  economies  that  most  of  the
enterprises that the rural households engage in are agriculture-based. Hence since most of the
enterprises that credit is based on are farming enterprises; the amount of income generated from
the said enterprises would be of significance in gauging the ability to repay the loans.
Distance to market indicates the location of the household in relation to a nearby urban
market. Hence the more the distance, the further the household is from the said market. It is
therefore north worthy that the further the household from the market, the lower the access to the34
financial institutions. Hence the positive significant relationship between distance to market and
participation in “village bank” credit indicates the importance of the program to rural households
in the remote inaccessible areas. A 10% increase therefore of distance to market leads to a 2.4%
points increase in the probability to participate in the credit program from the “village bank”.
Household assets as the other significant factor that influences participation in credit had a
negative effect. It is not surprising though given that apart from the ability to generate income by
the household, the other major factor to consider is character of the borrower and not the assets
in the rural settings. Given the informal nature of the “village banks” their capacity to enforce
legally their credit contracts in case of default is limited. Also the members with high value of
asset base would opt to go to alternative sources of credit given the high interest   in the village
bank (of up to 4% per month) and the condition of joining a group for one to access loan. Hence
a  1%  increase  in  per  capita  assets  will  lead  to  1.4%  points  reduction  in  the  probability  to
participate in the “village bank” credit.
Table 4.14: Elasticities/Marginal Effects of Selection Equation after Heckman
variable dy/ex(dx) Std. Err. z P>z X
lnoffarmypcap 0.315 0.094 3.370 0.001 7.664
lnfarmypcap 0.579 0.222 2.610 0.009 8.937
lndistmkt 0.242 0.102 2.380 0.018 2.360
lntransan -0.014 0.024 -0.570 0.565 1.804
lnasetpcap -1.380 0.399 -3.460 0.001 9.390
lnownlndsz 0.047 0.067 0.700 0.485 1.082
hhdage 0.006 0.004 1.390 0.164 43.056
hhdsize 0.009 0.011 0.850 0.397 8.536
hhdeducyrs 0.010 0.013 0.800 0.426 9.784
hhdgender -0.005 0.126 -0.040 0.967 1.144
hhdfarmown -0.041 0.339 -0.120 0.904 1.008
Source: Survey data
In  the  second  step  the  model  shows  results  of  the  effect  of  credit  and  household
characteristics  on  per  capita  expenditure.  Per  capita  household  expenditure  best  capture  the
welfare of the household as it indicates how much expenditure a household spend per member.
The per capita expenditure also captures the distribution of expenditure apart from the amount of
it.35
The  factors  that  significantly  influences  the  household  expenditure  and  hence  welfare
were “village bank” credit, credit from the other sources, age of the household head, off-farm
income, farm income and distance to market (Table 4.15).
Table 4.15: Step 2 Target Equation with Household Expenditure Per Capita (natural log) as
Dependent Variable
Coeff. Std. Err. z P>z
lnvbcrdt 0.381 0.098 3.900 0.000
lnothcrdt 0.058 0.031 1.880 0.060
hhdage 0.030 0.013 2.360 0.018
hhdsize -0.021 0.033 -0.620 0.535
hhdeducyrs 0.002 0.040 0.050 0.962
lnoffarmypcap 0.098 0.042 2.340 0.019
lnfarmypcap 0.228 0.079 2.890 0.004
lndistmkt 0.555 0.147 3.780 0.000
lntransan -0.010 0.040 -0.240 0.813
/athrho 0.883 0.231 3.830 0.000










LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): 
2(1) =    10.74   Prob > 
2 = 0.0010
Source: Survey data
The  elasticities  of  their  effects  on  per  capita household  expenditure  are  0.325,  0.024,
0.094, 0.225, 0.164 and 0.004 for “village bank” credit, credit from the other sources, off-farm
income, farm income, distance to market and household head age (Table 4.16). The amount of
credit from the village bank is the accumulative amount of credit accessed from the year 2006 to
end of year 2007. The rationale for taking the credit for the selected period is the fact that it takes
time for effect of credit to be realised and that taking repeat loans improves on their effect on
household welfare. Hence a 10% increase in the credit accessed will lead to a 3.25% increase in
the per capita household expenditure. This confirms to the findings of Wright et al (2000) that
established a positive relationship between credit and nutrition, health and primary schooling.36
The findings are further affirmed by Dunn and Elizabeth in Morduch (2002) that established that
borrower households spend 20% more on education than non-client households.
The amount of credit accessed from the other sources likewise leads to an increase in the
per capita household expenditure. A 10% increase of amount of credit accessed from the other
sources leads to a 0.24% increase in the per capita household expenditure. It follows therefore
that credit from whichever source has positive influence on the household welfare.
Off-farm enterprise activities as a source income positively influence both participation in
credit program and household welfare. It improves the household level of participation on credit
and subsequently also increases the welfare status of the household through increased per capita
expenditure. Hence a 10% increase in the off-farm income leads to a 1% increase in the per
capita household expenditure.
Likewise  farm  enterprise  activities  as  a  source  of  income  significantly  influence  the
household per capita expenditure positively. Farm income also positively influences participation
in credit programme and thus a dual positive effect on the household welfare. Hence it has an
effect of improving the household borrowing from the village which also have a positive effect
on  the  per  capita  expenditure  of  the  households.  Subsequently,  a  10%  increase  in  the  farm
income leads to a 2.25% increase in the household’s per capita expenditure.
As used in the selection equation the distance to market measures the household location
effect.  The  significant  positive  relationship  of  distance  to  market  and  per  capita  household
expenditure indicates that the further the household is away from the market, the higher the per
capita expenditure. Hence a 10% increase in the distance to market leads to a 1.64% increase in
the per capita expenditure. This can be explained by the variation in the agriculture potentiality
of the said areas. It worth nothing also that the further the household away from the market is the
higher the participation in the credit programme and hence improved per capita expenditure.
The age of the household as another significant variable influences the level of per capita
household expenditure positively. Household head age and farming years are highly correlated
indicating that the older the household head, the better the farming experience. Hence the older
the  household  head,  it  is  presumed  that  the  more  the  assets  they  have  accumulated  and
subsequently the higher the incomes they generate. Hence a 10% increase in the age of the
household head leads to a 0.4% increase in the per capita household expenditure.37
Table 4.16: Elasticities of Target Equation after Heckman
variable ey/ex(dx) Std. Err. z P>z X
lnvbcrdt 0.325 0.094 3.460 0.001 6.825
lnothcrt 0.024 0.013 1.870 0.062 3.309
lnoffarmypcap 0.094 0.040 2.370 0.018 7.664
lnfarmypcap 0.255 0.083 3.090 0.002 8.937
lndistmkt 0.164 0.043 3.780 0.000 2.360
lntransan -0.002 0.009 -0.240 0.813 1.804
hhdage 0.004 0.002 2.430 0.015 43.056
hhdsize -0.003 0.004 -0.620 0.537 8.536
hhdeducyrs 0.000 0.005 0.050 0.962 9.784
Source: Survey data
This conforms to the findings of Hashemi, and Morshed, in Morduch (2002) that there
was an increased caloric intake for households of Grameen bank participants. Further this was in
agreement with the findings of Khandker (2001) that microfinance participants do better than the
non-participants in per capita income, per capita expenditure and household net worth.
In summary, the assessment of impact of credit on the wide range of household parameters
helps to mitigate on the problem of loan fungibility. Hulme and Mosley (1997) indicated that for
all  studies  except  for  those  that  focus  exclusively  on  ‘the  enterprise’  the  concern  about
fungibility may be irrelevant. Since the study is looking at the household, or the household
economic portfolio, fungibility is not a problem but it is rather a vital strategy for the client. The
best investment returns may be on ‘consumption’ (in terms of developing or maintaining human
capital through school fees and doctors’ bills, or buying food at a time of crisis when the credit
terms on ‘in-kind'
Geda et  al.,  (2001)  applied  a  binomial  model  on  the  1994  WMS  data  to  compute
probabilities of being extremely poor, moderately poor and non-poor, given the characteristics of
the population. The study found that poverty is concentrated in rural areas and in the agricultural
sector in particular as being employed in the agricultural sector accounts for a good part of the
probability of being poor. Secondly, the educational attainment of the household head was found
to  be  the  most  important  factor  that  is  associated  with  not  being  in  poverty,  and  primary
education in particular was found to be of paramount importance in reducing extreme poverty in
rural areas. Thirdly, female-headed households were more likely to be poor.38
It is thus acknowledged that credit services plays a crucial role in improving welfare as
acknowledged by Wolday (2003) that the delivery of microfinance services to the rural poor in
Ethiopia is one effective instrument to promote food production and food security. Schreiner
(2002) established that the microfinance programmes that have proven successful in urban areas
are not likely to accept small deposits and give small loans for the poor in rural areas. There is
however ample  evidence to prove that there is a positive effect of microfinance on welfare
(Morduch, 2002). Microfinance is an instrument that, under the right conditions, fits the needs of
a broad range of the population—including the poorest—those in the bottom half of people
living below the poverty line (ibid). Providing microfinance can give poor people the means to
protect their livelihoods against shocks as well as to build up assets and diversity—also a means





The  use  of  income  and  household  expenditure  was  to  counter  the  methodological
problems relating to the fungibility of money. The following conclusions are drawn from the
study. The study found out that the “village bank” members who have used credit facility are
better  off  than  those  who  have  not  used  the  service.  This  was  expressed  through  higher
household expenditure and income which influence positively on improvement of welfare of the
households. It was also established that the “village bank” program as an innovation of user-
owned financial institution that provide the much needed financial services in areas that are
otherwise  excluded  from  the  mainstream  financial  system  is  playing  a  crucial  role  and
influencing positively on the various household outcomes. Hence the program occupies a central
position in the endeavour to improve the welfare of rural households.
The model fills a gap left by formal banks due to ease of flow of information of client’s
credit history. “Village bank” members who have used credit facility also participated more in
the use of extension services and attendance to farmer training. Hence participation in the credit
facility  provides  a  forum  for  access  to  other  supplementary  services  which  enable  the
participants to improve on their farming skills and hence improved production.
Even  without  having  conducted  a  systematic  study  on  the  impact  of  the  delivery of
financial services on welfare, we can logically arrive at the following conclusion: If welfare
improves as  a  result  of  better  physical  capital  endowments  and  if  the  delivery  of  financial
services as indicated earlier provides opportunities to increase income and household per capita
expenditure, then it is clear that the microfinance interventions contributes to the improvement of
welfare.
Nevertheless  although  economic  factors  are  certainly  significant  in  explaining  poverty
levels  among  rural  agricultural  households,  they  fail  to  account  for  all  causes  of  household
poverty, and why some households become and remain poor while others come out of poverty
yet they seem to operate within the same economic environment.40
5.2Recommendations
The following recommendations have been made from the study.
a) The “village bank” program should be expanded and target even the most vulnerable
group such as female headed households in order to realize reduced rural poverty, women
empowerment and increased asset ownership and food security.
b) There is a need for “village banks” to liaise with ministry of agriculture, livestock, Sports
and social services officials to improve on extension services and farmer training.
c) Most credit of the village bank is for a short period with an average repayment period of
five months and the interest rate charged is high at 4% per month. It is recommended that
the government allocates some funds to the loan fund to enable the “village banks” meet
their loan demand and make sufficient income which will enable them reduce the interest
of their loans and extent their repayment period. The study suggests that policies which
help households to smooth income can dramatically reduce poverty.
d) Further research on the subject matter is recommended to capture other issues which this
study has not been able to capture due to its limitations. Of importance is a study to
assess  the  institutional  capacity  of  “village  bank”  mainly  as  pertain  to  the  strengths,
weaknesses and areas of improvement.41
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APPENDIX A: HECKMAN MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD OUTPUT
Heckman selection model
Number of obs      =       125
Censored obs       =        40
Uncensored obs     =        85
Wald chi2(9)       =   3405.13,  Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Log likelihood = -199.5702
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
lnhsexpcap
lnvbcrdt 0.381 0.098 3.900 0.000
lnothcrdt 0.058 0.031 1.880 0.060
hhdage 0.030 0.013 2.360 0.018
hhdsize -0.021 0.033 -0.620 0.535
hhdeducyrs 0.002 0.040 0.050 0.962
lnoffarmypcap 0.098 0.042 2.340 0.019
lnfarmypcap 0.228 0.079 2.890 0.004
lndistmkt 0.555 0.147 3.780 0.000
lntransan -0.010 0.040 -0.240 0.813
Probability of borrowing equation
hhdgender -0.014 0.352 -0.040 0.967
hhdage 0.016 0.012 1.380 0.167
hhdeducyrs 0.028 0.036 0.800 0.426
hhdsize 0.025 0.030 0.840 0.399
lndistmkt 0.287 0.122 2.350 0.019
lnoffarmypcap 0.115 0.034 3.380 0.001
lnfarmypcap 0.182 0.069 2.610 0.009
lnasetpcap -0.412 0.118 -3.490 0.000
hhdfarmown -0.115 0.949 -0.120 0.904
lnownlndsz 0.122 0.173 0.700 0.483
lntransan -0.021 0.037 -0.580 0.565
/athrho 0.883 0.231 3.830 0.000




LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =    10.74   Prob > chi2 = 0.0010
Source: Survey data48
APPENDIX B: MARGINAL EFFECTS AFTER HECKMAN
variable ey/ex Std. Err. z P>z X
lnvbcrdt 0.325 0.094 3.460 0.001 6.825
lnothcrt 0.024 0.013 1.870 0.062 3.309
lnoffarmypcap 0.094 0.040 2.370 0.018 7.664
lnfarmypcap 0.255 0.083 3.090 0.002 8.937
lndistmkt 0.164 0.043 3.780 0.000 2.360
lntransan -0.002 0.009 -0.240 0.813 1.804
variable ey/dx Std. Err. z P>z X
hhdage 0.004 0.002 2.430 0.015 43.056
hhdsize -0.003 0.004 -0.620 0.537 8.536
hhdeducyrs 0.000 0.005 0.050 0.962 9.784
variable dy/ex Std. Err. z P>z X
lnoffarmypcap 0.315 0.094 3.370 0.001 7.664
lnfarmypcap 0.579 0.222 2.610 0.009 8.937
lndistmkt 0.242 0.102 2.380 0.018 2.360
lntransan -0.014 0.024 -0.570 0.565 1.804
lnasetpcap -1.380 0.399 -3.460 0.001 9.390
lnownlndsz 0.047 0.067 0.700 0.485 1.082
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z X
hhdage 0.006 0.004 1.390 0.164 43.056
hhdsize 0.009 0.011 0.850 0.397 8.536
hhdeducyrs 0.010 0.013 0.800 0.426 9.784
hhdgender -0.005 0.126 -0.040 0.967 1.144
hhdfarmown -0.041 0.339 -0.120 0.904 1.008
Source: Survey data50
APPENDIX C: RESEARCH SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
RESEARCH TOPIC:  Impact of credit on poverty alleviation and food security: The Case of “Village Bank” model in Bomet District, Kenya
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AND AGRIBUSINESS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT
EGERTON UNIVERSITY51
Section A:  General Information
14. Date of interview [_______________________________________________]




19. SECTION B :  Household profile
19.1. Number of Household members (including HH head) living permanently on the compound: [A person is in residence if they sleep in the house a majority of nights
per week]
Age Categories  Males Years  of schooling Female Years  of schooling Total Number Actually working on the
farm  at  once a  week
< 12 years [ __ ___ ]           [ __ ___ ] [__ __]        [ __ ___ ] [__ ___] [________]
12 – 20 [ __ ___ ]           [ __ ___ ] [__ __]        [ __ ___ ] [__ ___] [________]
21 –50 [ __ ___ ]           [ __ ___ ] [__ __]        [ __ ___ ] [__ ___] [________]
> 50years [ __ ___ ]           [ __ ___ ] [__ __]     [ __ ___ ] [__ ___] [________]
Total [ __ ___ ]           [ __ ___ ] [__ __]        [ __ ___ ] [__ ___] [_________]
Maximum years of Schooling
Number of children attending school
19.2. Number of Non-Resident Household members, living away but who occasionally benefit or assist the farm activities
Age Categories  Males                         Years  of schooling Female                          Years  of schooling Total
< 12 years [ __ ___ ]                         [ __ ___ ] [__ __]                               [ __ ___ ] [__ ___]
12-20 [ __ ___ ]                         [ __ ___ ] [__ __]                                 [ __ ___ ] [__ ___]
21-50 [ __ ___ ]                         [ __ ___ ] [__ __] [ __ ___ ] [__ ___]
> 50 years [ __ ___ ]                         [ __ ___ ] [__ __]                                 [ __ ___ ] [__ ___]
Total [ __ ___ ]                         [ __ ___ ] [__ __]                                 [ __ ___ ] [__ ___]
Maximum years of schooling52
19.3. Provide the following detail about the household head
Gender
1 = Male, 2 = Female
Age (years) Primary activity Farming experience (years) Education
(Years)
[ ___ ] [ __  ___ ] [ ___ ] [ __ ___ ] [ ___ ]
20. Is the household head the farm owner? [ ___ ] 1=Yes  2=No. If not, who is the farm owner ? [ ___ __________________________________________]
21. Type of wall for the house 1. mud,  2. wooden   3. Bricks   4.  Stone,
22. Type of roof for the house,  1. grass, 2. iron-sheet,  3.  tiles
23. Type of floor 1. earth  2. cemented  3. Tiled floor
24. SECTION C: Structure of landownership (acres)
Tenure system (acres) Total size
Owned Rented in Rented out Communal
Acres [_________] [_____________] [____________________] [____________________] [______________________-]
12. CROP ENTERPRISES































[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
































[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [______] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [____]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]
[_____] [_____] [_____] [_____] [______] [_________] [______] [______] [____] [______] [____] [______]53
25. Asset endowments (numbers)
Asset Number If would sell now, at what price
Ksh
























26. HOUSEHOLD INCOME SOURCES IN KSH IN 2007
Type of earning Amount in ksh Time period in days
Employment income
Total Income from business
Total Income from crop produce
Total Income from milk sales
Total Income from sale of livestock and other assets e.g. land, vehicle
Transfer earnings from relatives, sons, daughters etc
Value of gifts
Land rented out income
Buildings rented out income
Other structures rented out income
Motor vehicle rented out income
Other income
13 (a) Employment Income
We would now like to talk about all salaried employment that anyone in your household engaged in during the past months from January  2007
to December 2007 including pensions and remittances.  Include only income remitted back to household.
If the person did not earn the same wage during all 12 months, please indicate the wage earned for each
month individually (Kshs)
Skip this section if person received the same monthly wage during the whole year
Person name










From the list below,
please list all the
salaried employment
activities in which this
person was engaged at


















1/07 2/07 3/07 4/07 5/07 6/07 7/07 8/07 9/07 10/07 11/07 12/07












































































Prod freq period qty unit avexp Prod freq period qty unit avexp
Staples Non-Fresh Food Items
Millet 1 Sugar 23
Sorghum 2 Salt 24
Wheat flour 3 Cooking oil 25
Rice 4 Coffee/Tea 26
Cassava (Fresh or  Dry) 5 Drinks 27
Maize (Grains) 6 Tobacco/Cigarettes 28
Maize meal
(Posho/sifted)
7 Other non Fresh Items 29
Sweet potatoes 8 Non-food Items Amount
Irish potatoes 9 School fee, textbooks, etc 30
Matoke 10 Medical fee 31
Beans 11 Transportation 32
Other Staples 12 Clothing/Shoes 3357
28. Access to market
Time in
minutes
Fare in Ksh Km Tarmac Km Earth
Input/output  market Nearest local market
Most important (urban)
29. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
29.1. Have you received extension contacts in the last year: 0-No,   1-Yes
29.2. if yes, How many times[____________________]
29.3. Have you attended farmer training last year? 0-No, 1-Yes
29.4. If yes, how many times [______________________]
29.5. Did you  borrow last year (Yes-1, No-0)
Non-Staple Fresh Food Cooking/Lighting fuel 34
Green Peas 13 Soap/washing products 35
Meats 14 Other non food items 36
Eggs 15 Contributions Amount
Chicken (meat) 16 Remittances to relatives 37
Fish 17 Churches/Mosques
Fish (omena) 18 38
Vegetables 19 Mutual Support Groups/Funeral 39
Fruits 20 Cooperatives/committees 40
Dairy products(ghee, milk
etc)
21 Other local organizations 41
Other Non-staples 2258
29.6.  If yes, fill in the table below:
Borrowed 0-No
1-Yes

























29.7. Did you get credit from other sources tick Yes or No such 1. Bank YES/NO_ 2. Cooperative YES/NO, 3. Input Supplier_ YES/NO, 4.
Money lender (shylock), YES/NO __, 5. Friends/ neighbors/relatives, YES/NO__, 6. Other Non-linked group YES/NO     7. other (specify)
____________________________________________
29.8. HOW MUCH did you borrow from each source 1. From Bank _________Ksh.  2. From Cooperative __________Ksh. 3. From input supplier
_________Ksh.4. From money lender/shylock ________________Ksh.  5. From Friends/ neighbors/relatives ______________Ksh
29.9. How did you spend the loan last year specify uses and amounts here:





































30. Any constraints in credit provision from the village bank (let the respondent specify as many as possible, ___________________________
31. Constraints from other sources you used ( let respondent specify the other sources and respective constraints as many as
possible______________________________________________________________________________________________
19. FOOD-SECURITY SURVEY MODULE:
3-STAGE DESIGN ( 2 INTERNAL SCREENERS )
Questionnaire transition into module--administer to all households: These next questions are about the food eaten in your household in the last
12 months, since (current month) of last year, and whether you were able to afford the food you need.
General food sufficiency question/screener: Questions 1, 1a, and 1b (OPTIONAL: These questions are NOT used in calculating the food-
security/hunger scale.) Question 1 may be used as a screener: (a) in conjunction with income as a preliminary screen to reduce respondent
burden for higher income households only; and/or (b) in conjunction with the 1st-stage internal screen to make that screen "more open"--i.e.,
provide another route through it.
1. [IF ONE PERSON IN HOUSEHOLD USE "I" IN PARENTHETICALS, OTHERWISE,
USE "WE."]
Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household in the last 12 months?: --enough of the kinds of food (I/we) want to
eat; --enough, but not always the kinds of food (I/we) want; --sometimes not enough to eat; or, --often not enough to eat?
[1] Enough of the kinds of food we want to eat [SKIP 1a and 1b]
[2] Enough but not always the kinds of food we want [SKIP 1a; ask 1b]
[3] Sometimes not enough to eat [Ask 1a; SKIP 1b]
[4] Often not enough [Ask 1a; SKIP 1b]
[ ] DK or Refused (SKIP 1a and 1b)
1a. [IF OPTION 3 OR 4 SELECTED, ASK] Here are some reasons why people don't always have enough to eat. For each one, please tell me if
that is a reason why YOU don't always have enough to eat. [READ LIST. MARK ALL THAT APPLY.]
YES NO DK
[  ] [  ] [  ] Not enough money for food
[  ] [  ] [  ] Not enough time for shopping or cooking60
[  ] [  ] [  ] Too hard to get to the store
[  ] [  ] [  ] On a diet
[  ] [  ] [  ] No working stove available
[  ] [  ] [  ] Not able to cook or eat because of health problems
1b. [IF OPTION 2 SELECTED, ASK] Here are some reasons why people don't always have the quality or variety of food they want. For each
one, please tell me if that is a reason why YOU don't always have the kinds of food you want to eat. [READ LIST. MARK ALL THAT
APPLY.]
YES NO DK
[  ] [  ] [  ] Not enough money for food
[  ] [  ] [  ] Kinds of food (I/we) want not available
[  ] [  ] [  ] Not enough time for shopping or cooking
[  ] [  ] [  ] Too hard to get to the store
[  ] [  ] [  ] On a special diet
BEGIN FOOD-SECURITY CORE MODULE (i.e., SCALE ITEMS)
Stage 1: Questions 2-6 --ask all households:
[IF SINGLE ADULT IN HOUSEHOLD, USE "I," "MY," AND “YOU” IN PARENTHETICALS; OTHERWISE, USE "WE," "OUR," AND
"YOUR HOUSEHOLD;" IF UNKNOWN OR AMBIGUOUS, USE PLURAL FORMS.]
2. Now I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about their food situation. For these statements, please tell me whether
the statement was often true, sometimes true, or never true for (you/your household) in the last 12 months, that is, since last (name of current
month).
The first statement is “(I/We) worried whether (my/our) food would run out before (I/we) got money to buy more.” Was that often true,
sometimes true, or never true for (you/your household) in the last 12 months?
[  ] Often true
[  ] Sometimes true
[  ] Never true
[  ] DK or Refused
3. “The food that (I/we) bought just didn’t last, and (I/we) didn’t have money to get more.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for
(you/your household) in the last 12 months?
[  ] Often true
[  ] Sometimes true
[  ] Never true61
[  ] DK or Refused
4. “(I/we) couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for (you/your household) in the last 12 months?
[  ] Often true
[  ] Sometimes true
[  ] Never true
[  ] DK or Refused
[IF CHILDREN UNDER 18 IN HOUSEHOLD, ASK Q5 - 6;
OTHERWISE SKIP TO 1st-Level Screen.]
5. “(I/we) relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed (my/our) child/the children) because (I was/we were) running out of money to buy
food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for (you/your household) in the last 12 months?
[  ] Often true
[  ] Sometimes true
[  ] Never true
[  ] DK or Refused
6. “(I/We) couldn’t feed (my/our) child/the children) a balanced meal, because (I/we) couldn’t afford that.” Was that often, sometimes, or never
true for (you/your household) in the last 12 months?
[  ] Often true
[  ] Sometimes true
[  ] Never true
[  ] DK or Refused
1st-level Screen (screener for Stage 2): If AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE to ANY ONE of Questions 2-6 (i.e., "often true" or "sometimes
true") OR response [3] or [4] to Question 1 (if administered), then continue to Stage 2; otherwise, skip to end.
Stage 2: Questions 7-11 --ask households passing the 1st-level Screen.
[IF CHILDREN UNDER 18 IN HOUSEHOLD, ASK Q7; OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q8]
7. "(My/Our child was/The children were) not eating enough because (I/we) just couldn't afford enough food." Was that often, sometimes, or
never true for (you/your household) in the last 12 months?
[  ] Often true
[  ] Sometimes true
[  ] Never true
[  ] DK or R
8. In the last 12 months, since last (name of current month), did (you/you or other adults in your household) ever cut the size of your meals or
skip meals because there wasn't enough money for food?62
[  ] Yes
[  ] No (SKIP 8a)
[  ] DK or R (SKIP 8a)
8a. [IF YES ABOVE, ASK] How often did this happen---almost every month, some months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
[  ] Almost every month
[  ] Some months but not every month
[  ] Only 1 or 2 months
[  ] DK or R
9. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there wasn't enough money to buy food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No
[  ] DK or R
10. In the last 12 months, were you every hungry but didn't eat because you couldn't afford enough food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No
[  ] DK or R
11. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because you didn't have enough money for food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No
[  ] DK or R
2nd-level Screen (screener for Stage 3): If AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE to ANY ONE of Questions 7 through 11, then continue to Stage
3; otherwise, skip to end.
Stage 3: Questions 12-16 --ask households passing the 2nd-level Screen.
12. In the last 12 months, did (you/you or other adults in your household) ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn't enough money for
food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No (SKIP 12a)
[  ] DK or R (SKIP 12a)
12. [IF YES ABOVE, ASK] How often did this happen---almost every month, some months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
[  ] Almost every month
[  ] Some months but not every month
[  ] Only 1 or 2 months63
[  ] DK or R
 [IF CHILDREN UNDER 18 IN HOUSEHOLD ASK 13-16; OTHERWISE SKIP TO END.]
13. The next questions are about children living in the household who are under 18 years old. In the last 12 months, since (current month) of last
year, did you ever cut the size of (your child's/any of the children's) meals because there wasn't enough money for food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No
[  ] DK or R
14. In the last 12 months, did (CHILD’S NAME/any of the children) ever skip meals because there wasn't enough money for food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No (SKIP 14a)
[  ] DK or R (SKIP 14a)
14a. [IF YES ABOVE ASK] How often did this happen---almost every month, some months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
[  ] Almost every month
[  ] Some months but not every month
[  ] Only 1 or 2 months
[  ] DK or R
15. In the last 12 months, (was your child/ were the children) ever hungry but you just couldn't afford more food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No
[  ] DK or R
16. In the last 12 months, did (your child/any of the children) ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn't enough money for food?
[  ] Yes
[  ] No
[  ] DK or R
END OF FOOD-SECURITY/HUNGER CORE MODULE